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 
What is Implicit Bias?1


1. Introduction
Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have lead scholars 
to posit 	

. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures, 
that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self report 
measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what 
does it mean to characterise such biases as ? Can we satisfactorily identify the 
grounds for identifying them as 	
? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions are in fact being 
measured; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses?
 In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged 
when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive 
taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what 
implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices. First, let us get some 
paradigm cases of the phenomena at issue on the table.

2. The phenomenaon
These are the sorts of behavioural indirect measures that have provided evidence of the 
existence of implicit biases,2 and serve t reveal can stand in as paradigms of the sort of 
psychological phenomena that philosophers have engaged with.

a. Implicit Association Tests
Perhaps the most well known of these measures, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has 
been participated in millions of times, both in laboratory studies and via online testing hubs 
(such as that run by Project Implicit https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/). These studies are 
essentially categorisation tasks where participants are instructed to classify a target stimulus 
(terms or images) into one of two pairs of categories. For example a race IAT asks 
participants to press one key to classify a target stimulus as belonging to the disjunctive 
category ‘white or negative’ and a different key to classify the target as ‘black or positive’. 
Then the category pairings switch: one key represents the disjunctive category ‘white or 
positive’ and the other ‘black or negative’. Participants are instructed to categorise as quickly 
as possible whilst making as few errors as possible: they face a speed/accuracy trade off. 
Responses which are too fast or too slow are eliminated to prevent random fast clicking or 
any attempt to ‘game or /manipulate’ the test. The speed of categorisation and number of 
errors made with the first set of disjunctive categories (white/negative; black/positive) are 
compared with that from the second (white/positive; black/negative).3 If an individual who is 
slower and/or makes more errors when black is categorised with positive and white with 
 

 This paper was produced as part of a Leverhulme Trust research project grant on Bias and Blame (RPG 2013 
326). We are grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for their support. Acknowledgements removed.
2
 Note that this is not the only sort of evidence available to us: testimonial evidence, from victims and witnesses, 
about unintentional or unwitting discrimination by people who professed non discriminatory attitudes is pervasive 
and predates the upsurge of attention from empirical psychologists. See Holroyd & Puddifoot (forthcoming) for 
discussion of the problems attendant upon the way philosophers have treated these different sources of 
evidence. 
3
For details of the IAT scoring algorithm see Greenwald, A. G. et al (2003).
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 
negative, than when white is categorised with positive and black with negative, it is inferred 
from this pattern of responses that she has more accessible, and therefore other things 
being equal stronger, unconscious associations between black people and negative 
evaluations.4 
The majority of people racialised white perform in this way, which suggests that they 
have stronger negative associations with black people.5 In participants racialised black, 
approximately half have negative associations with black people.6 Moreover, in black 
participants, the overall pattern of responses is interpreted as a demonstrating weak rather 
than strong preference for white over black people (Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald, 2002: 105). 
These patterns of response haveis has been consistently found both when race is 
represented by images (pictures of black and white faces) and when it is represented 
lexically (stereotypically black  or white sounding names).7 
IATs and other indirect measures are used to access not only associations with 
stigmatised social groups (such as gender, ethnicity, age, disability), but also associations 
between various target concepts. The Project Implicit site includes flower/insect IATs, for 
example; and such measures have also been used (e.g.) to better understand brand 
associations by the marketing industry. Other indirect measures include semantic priming 
measures (Banaji & Hardin, 1996), the Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne et al 2005), 
and the Go/No Go Association Test (Nosek & Banaji 2001). 8

b. hiring decisions
SoIndirect measures such as the IAT are taken to reveal implicit attitudes, which are 
hypothesised to underpin discriminatory behaviours.me studies have monitored behaviours 
in contexts intended to more closely approximate the ‘real world’. Some studies focus on the 
behaviours that might be influenced by implicit biases. For example, in one study individuals 
were asked to evaluate the qualifications and credentials of potential job applicants, and 
report back on how likely they were to recommend that the individual be hired. When the 
applicant’s materials indicated they were racialised black, the evaluations were less positive, 
and fewer hiring recommendations made, than when the applicant was indicated as 
racialised white (Dovidio & Gartner 2000. See also Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). 
Steinpreis et al (1999) sent out CVs (for an early career researcher) to academic 
psychologists in the US. The CVs were identical, but sometimes identified the applicant as 
female, other times as male. Those rating the CVs were more likely to evaluate positively the 
very same CV when it had a male name at the top (see also Moss Racusin et al 2012). In 
 
4
 For recent discussion of the predictive validity of the IAT, and its significance, see the roundtable discussion at 
The Brains Blog: http://philosophyofbrains.com/2017/01/17/how can we measure implicit bias a brains blog 
roundtable.aspx 
5
 Note that some authors have distinguished between ‘associations' (taken to be connections between concepts, 
such as a social group and stereotypical content) and ‘evaluations’ (taken to be connections between positive or 
negative notions and the target object). Again, see the FAQ at Project Implicit for an example of this framing. 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq6 See also Amodio & Devine 2006. However, 
it is unclear whether this characterisation is theoretically viable, and much will depend on the view one takes of 
what is measured by the IAT. See Holroyd & Sweetman 2016, and Madva & Brownstein 2016, for discussion of 
whether such ways of categorising the states measured are defensible.
6
 See the discussion of responses gathered from white and black participants at Project Implicit: 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq19
7
Dovidio et al, (1997); Nosek,et al.. (2007).
8
 For a useful discussion of these measures, see: Brownstein 2017
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 
bothsuch studies, these effects were found in cases where there was room for discretion   
the applicant was neither obviously ‘stellar’ nor obviously unqualified. And, in both cases 
these effects were found notwithstanding the participants’ respective self reported anti racist 
attitudes, or commitments to evaluating objectively the applicants. If these self evaluations 
are to be taken at face value, it would appear that the participants do not realise that they 
are under evaluating black or female candidates, nor do they intend to do so. The effects 
have been attributed, then, to implicit biases, rather than explicit prejudice.9 

c. Microbehaviours
A cluster of studies have examined responses that involve affective processes and their 
manifestation in behavioural responses. These are studies on ‘micro behaviours’. They have 
tended to focus on   unintentional non verbal behaviours that manifest tension or 
discomfort.10 For example, the eye blink rate of an individual, the extent to which she 
engages in fidgeting behaviours, and how closely she positions herself to other individuals, 
are instances of these non verbal behaviours. Such behaviours are often automatic, and not 
under the intentional guidance of the agent. White people have been found to display these 
micro behaviours to greater degrees in interracial interactions with black interlocutors, 
affecting the quality of those interactions (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gartner 2002; Dovidio, 
Gaertner, Kawakami & Hodson, 2002).

Whilst these studies help us to get a handle on the phenomena at issue, there remain the 
questions to which we seek precise answers: first, in what sense are the mental goings on 
which produce these responses ? Second, what are the criteria we should use to 
diagnose a response as 	
? And finally, how should we characterise the psychological 
phenomena underpinning these responses? In the following sections, we address these 
questions, identifying the relationships between the different answers.

3. Theoretical choices
It is worth spelling out different aims that appear to inform the various answers that have 
been given to these questions. These have rarely been made explicit, but rather appear to 
be tacit or unarticulated assumptions that theorists have in mind as desiderata for a 
successful account of implicit bias. We state them here, but go on to tease out their 
relationship to the accounts presented below: 

D1: to distinguish implicit from explicit mental states or processes.

D2: to capture interesting cases of dissonance between agent’s’ professed values 
and the cognitions driving responses to these measures. 

D3: to formulate interventions for changing bias, or blocking discriminatory outcomes. 
 
9
 For a helpful overview of a range of behavioural effects taken to be influenced by implicit biases, see Jost et al 
2009. 
10
 Whilst the studies we mention have focused on these sorts of micro behaviour, note that micro behaviours 
could also manifest positive attitudes, and could include verbal behaviours (such as slips of the tongue). Thanks 
to an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this point.
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 

D4: to accommodate or explain the full range of the phenomena captured by indirect 
measures.

D5: to gain traction in addressing problems of marginalisation and under 
representation, and draw attention to complicity in these problems.11

In broader terms, it is worth noting that some of these aims are directed at capturing some 
unified psychological kind assumed to be operative in the phenomena described (D1 D3); 
others are more focused on pragmatic or political aims (D4, D5). We grant legitimacy to 
each of these aims: but as we will see, these desiderata cannot all be met at once, so 
theoretical choices have to be made about what one wants an account of implicit bias to do. 
These choices govern the appeal of certain ways of characterising 	
 and the 
psychological reality that these states or processes may have.

4. What is 
What does it mean to identify some state or process as implicit? In this section, we aim to 
show three things. First, that that there are various competing ways of characterising the 
implicit; second, that the choice one makes about how to characterise the implicit depends 
on prior theoretical choices about the phenomena one is aiming to capture. Finally, no one 
view unproblematically carves our cognitions into implicit and explicit.

 Implicit as unconscious
The mostA common understanding of the , both amongst lay persons, psychologists, 
and philosophers, is equivalent to 

. To see how this understanding has informed 
public discourse and lay understandings of the phenomena, observe that Wikipedia defines 
implicit attitudes as “evaluations that occur without conscious awareness...”.12 Scholarly but 
public facing sources such as Tthe frequently asked questions page of the Project Implicit 
website explains that implicit attitudes are: “positive and negative evaluations that occur 
outside of our conscious awareness and control”.13 In academic publications, Gawronski et 
al, noted that “a widespread assumption underlying the application of indirect measures is 
that they provide access to unconscious mental associations that are difficult to assess with 
standard self report measures” (2006, p486).14 Many philosophers also use implicit in this 
sense. For example, Machery et al describe implicit biases as “biases [individuals] are not 
aware of having” (2010, p.227) and Kelly characterises implicit biases as “outside of 
person’s conscious awareness” (2013, p.460). The initial appeal of this characterisation is 
that it seems to provide a helpful way of distinguishing implicit from explicit   consciously 
held   states or processes. This characterisation may be driven by desiderata:
 
11
 This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but we identified these aims as the most salient   albeit usually 
unstated   to the accounts considered below.
12 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicit_attitude
13 https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/faqs.html#faq0
14
 The authors Gawronski cites as making this assumption include: Bacchus et al., 2004, Banaji, 2001, Bosson et 
al., 2000, Brunstein and Schmitt, 2004, Cunningham et al., 2004, Greenwald and Banaji, 1995, Jost et al., 2002, 
Phelps et al., 2000, Rudman et al., 1999, Spalding and Hardin, 1999, Teachman et al., 2001 and Wilson, 2002
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 

 D1: to distinguish implicit from explicit mental states or processes.

Moreover, seeing implicit biases as unconscious explains the fact that many people find the 
outcomes of indirect measures surprising, given their failure to accord with their professed 
values. This understanding is further motivated by the desiderata:

 D2: to capture interesting cases of dissonance between agent’s professed values 
 and the cognitions driving responses to these measures.

However, note that for some theorists (including some mentioned above) the implicit is not 


	 unconscious; rather it is characterised as 	 outside of conscious 
awareness. For example, Brownstein and Saul introduce implicit bias as “a term of art 
referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside of conscious awareness or 
control” (2016, p1). Whilst characterisations based on what is typical are not vulnerable to 
counterexamples in the same way as those which see bias as necessarily unconscious, they 
thereby offer a less principled basis for drawing the implicit explicit distinction.
 A further concern with understanding  as 

 is that there are various 
possibilities regarding 	 the agent is unconscious of (see Gawronskia et al, 2006; and 
Holroyd, 2014). Contenders include that the individual lacks consciousness of:
 
  i. The bias itself (the mental state, process or trait)
  ii. The influence of the bias on the decision or action (whether or how the  
  decision or action has been influenced)
  iii. The source or cause of the bias

Regarding i. evidence suggests that individuals may be able to accurately predict their own 
IAT outcomes, without having any previous experience of taking an IAT on which to base 
their prediction (Hahn et al 2013). This suggests individuals have some awareness of the 
cognitions revealed on such measures. Furthermore, if lacking consciousness in this sense 
is a requirement, rather than typically true, of implicit biases, this entails that a bias is no 
longer implicit once a person has becomes aware that they have it.15
 Regarding ii. Hahn et al (2013), Monteith et al (2001) and Scaife et al 
(ms.forthcoming) both found that participants self reports of their experience of taking the 
IAT accurately tracked their IAT scores. In the latter study a number of participants reported 
experiencing difficulties in the incongruent (counter stereotype) blocks of the IAT. Since in 
such studies, participants were aware of experiencing incongruent blocks of the IAT as more 
difficult, this suggests that individuals can gain awareness of the influence that biases exert 
on their responses, and can accurately report on this influence. On these occasions, 
individuals are not unaware of the influence of the bias on their responses, suggesting that 
the influence of biases is not necessarily outside conscious awareness..
 
15
 Another contender for the sense of awareness relevant is that individuals lack awareness of the body of 
research on implicit bias. Similarly, on this characterisation, biases will seekcease to be implicit once people 
learn of this research.
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 	
 Regarding iii. it is likely that few people have awareness of how their cognitions came 
to be structured in the ways revealed by indirect measures. However, this will not distinguish 
implicit from explicit cognition, since few people are aware of the source of their explicit 
mental states and decisions (see Wilson 2002; Johansson et al, 2005; Carruthers 2010 & 
2011; and Hall et al, 2012). So if one is motivated by D1, this characterisation will lose its 
appeal. 
 In sum: various available understandings of the  as 

fail to cohere 
with empirical evidence about the sort of awareness individuals appear to have; or fail to 
pick out a feature that distinguishes it from the explicit states (those typically thought of as 
conscious).  

b. Implicit as beyond control
An alternative understanding of  pertains to the kind of control that individuals have   
or lack   with respect to the states or processes at issue. Some have suggested that what 
characterises states and processes as implicit is that they are beyond direct control: an 
individual cannot remove or prevent the impact of an implicit bias through an act of will (i.e. 
simply by choosing to do so) (Saul 2013, Kelly & Roedder 2008).16 The claim is not that 
individuals have no control at all over implicit biases; a number of authors have noted  that 
implicit biases are still subject to various forms of indirect control (see Faucher 2016, 
Holroyd 2012, Brownstein 2015) and ecological control (see Holroyd & Kelly, 20165).
 Characterising the implicit in these terms seems to be motivated both by a concern to 
contrast with the explicit (D1), and to explain dissonance (D2)   because those actions 
influenced by implicit biases cannot be guided by the agent's reflective values. Note also that 
the focus on kind of control is also useful for meeting a further aim:  
 
D3: to formulate interventions for changing/mitigating bias, or blocking discriminatory 
outcomes.

If it is definitive of biases that they are beyond our direct control, this firmly focuses attention 
on new kinds of indirect strategies that are more likely to succeed in mitigating the role of 
bias, or insulating outcomes from its influence.17 
 Whether such a characterisation can meet these desiderata (in particular, D1 & D2), 
depends on whether we can in fact cleanly distinguish between direct and indirect control. 
Moreover, even if this distinction can be satisfactorily made, it is not clear that it would cut in 
an intuitive place between the implicit and explicit. Many other cognitive processes and 
states which one might expect to fall on the explicit side of the distinction are also beyond 
our direct control. Whilst some beliefs can be changed at will, others cannot   yet the 
inclination to describe beliefs as explicit or implicit does not appear to correspond to this 
feature, namely, whether and how they can be altered. Characterising the implicit as beyond 
 
16
 In fact, there is evidence indicating that trying to suppress implicit bias through an act of will can have a 
rebound effect (Follenfant & Ric 2010).
17
 Other considerations may further motivate the move to characterise implicit biases in terms of control rather 
than unconsciousness: see Duguid and Thomas  Hunt (2015) for concerns that merely raising awareness about 
bias can in fact worsen the problem. In any case, as Saul rightly remarks: “even once [individuals] become aware 
that they are likely to have implicit biases, they do not instantly become able to control their biasesN”. (2013a, 
55)
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
direct control, then, appears to be over inclusive. Many   perhaps all   beliefs and attitudes 
cannot be immediately controlled by acts of will.
 However, if one is motivated primarily by D3, and gives little weight to D1 and D2, 
then it may not matter if the criterion is over  inclusive, and extends also to include some 
states or processes typically thought of as explicit.

c. Implicit as dissonant/unendorsed
One might identify the implicit as being 

	 with the agent’s other (or central) 
cognitions; implicit biases as unendorsed. Glasgow emphasizes that people are 		 
from their biases in that “they sincerely and truly claim that their biases do not represent who 
they 	 are” (2016, p37). Similarly, Frankish has proposed that we should understand 
biases as implicit when an agent “does not endorse it in her conscious reasoning and 
decision making” (2016, p.25). And Levy argues that the type of processing characteristic of 
implicit biases prohibits them from truly reflecting the agent, because their associative 
structure excludes them from being subject to 'rule based processing'. Accordingly, for Levy, 
biases are ‘patchy’ and cannot be inferentially sensitive to, or integrated with, the agent’s 
other evidence sensitive attitudes (2015, p.812 816).
  It is clear enough that seeing dissonance as characteristic of implicit biases is 
primarily motivated by the aim:

 D2: to capture interesting cases of dissonance between agent’s’ professed values 
 and the cognitions driving responses to these measures.

This difference between behavioural responses on indirect measures, and self reported 
attitudes draws a lot of attention; it is perhaps the most striking feature of paradigm cases of 
implicit bias. Furthermore, there are good pragmatic reasons to focus on such cases 
because those who disavow their biases are likely to be highly motivated to take whatever 
steps are necessary to prevent their implicit biases influencing them.
 But it should also be clear that one cannot at the same time meet this aim whilst also 
meeting some of the other desiderata. In particular, accounts that characterise implicit 
biases in terms of dissonance fail:
 
 D4: to accommodate or explain the full range of the phenomena captured by indirect 
 measures.
 
Implicit biases may align or in accord with explicit attitudes (Zheng 2016; Holroyd 2016). 
While such cases have received little attention there are a number of studies which indicate 
that such alignment is to be expected: Devine et al (2002) found that implicit race biases 
were stronger in individuals who showed more explicit racial prejudice on self report 
measures. Yet there will be no implicit bias to speak of in these cases, if the implicit is 
characterised in terms of dissonance. For example, in considering cases in which implicit 
biases become integrated with the agent's explicit attitudes, becoming ‘annexed’ to her 
endorsed attitudes, Levy writes that ’it is an open question whether implicit attitudes survive 
such annexation: an annexed attitude possesses the appropriate set of inferential relations 
to other attitudes, and thereby cease to be a patchy endorsement. If implicit attitudes are 
always patchy endorsements, such an annexed attitude transforms into an ordinary attitude 
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
(conscious or not)’ (2017, 21. We discuss Levy’s notion of patchy endorsements below). 
Hence we can see that whilst reserving the notion of implicit bias for cases in which there is 
dissonance, or a failure of ‘annexation', is legitimate, the resulting characterisation will be ill 
placed to also meet D4.18

d. Implicit as accessed by certain kinds of measure.
Given these difficulties, we might simply think that the domain of the implicit is delineated by 
what is revealed on indirect measures, such as those earlier described. This strategy is 
deployed by some psychologists., who avoid giving a precise definition of what makes 
biases For example, Fazio and Olson claim that “Nit is more appropriate to view the 
measure as implicit or explicit ... What makes priming or the IAT implicit is that these 
techniques provide estimates of individuals’ attitudes without our having to directly ask them 
for such information” (2003 p.303). Note, however, that Fazio endorses a view whereby the 
measures alone are implicit or explicit; the representations measured should not themselves 
be conceived of in those terms (Fazio & Towles Schwen 1999). If one seeks to draw 	 
distinction (motivated by D1) one could We could say (departing from Fazio's usage), then, 
that certainthe measures are implicit, and whatever is revealed by those measures then 
inherits the label ‘implicit’. Alternatively, we might say a bias is implicit if it is revealed by 
indirect measure.19 Such a view is appealing insofar as one is motivated by 

D4: to accommodate the full range of the phenomena captured by indirect measures.

Such a characterisation will 	 capture all the results of indirect measures as falling 
within the domain of implicit cognition. This is attractive because, as we have seen, it is 
tricky to specify a principled way of defining the implicit.
 Note, though, that in understanding in this sense   as that detected by indirect 
measures   we gain virtually no theoretical insight into the properties that such states may 
possess, nor how or whether they are distinct from states typically thought of as explicit. This 
is because the fact that they can be accessed by an indirect measure does not tell us that 
they can  be accessed in this way. That they are revealed in automatic responses does 
not tell us that they cannot be controlled; that they can operate without the agent's 
awareness does not tell us that they always do. Accordingly this characterisation does not 
help us to delineate the properties of implicit biases, nor whether they are such that other 
measures (direct or self report measures) cannot access them. Moreover, such a view 
provides no conceptualisation of what such states are nor when and why they might diverge 
from other attitudes. In particular, no information is provided about why we might need, or at 
least be better able, to access them via indirect measure rather than some other means. 
This hollowed out notion of the implicit therefore provides no insight into when we might 
doubt the accuracy of self report measures, nor why, on those occasions, we might expect 
implicit measures to provide different, or more (or less) predictive results from those 
garnered through self report.
 
18
 See Holroyd 2016 for discussion of this aspect of Levy's view, and in particular of whether it is able to make 
fine grained distinctions, in the moral assessments of agents who harbour implicit biases, that we might hope to.
19
 Note that Fazio and Olson hold back from these labels, instead suggesting that the terms implicit or explicit 
should perhaps not be applied to the states or processes, but to the measures alone. On their view, these 
different measures access the same psychological construct: the agent's attitude. 
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
 It may be that in fact, some unstated assumptions are at work when this usage of 
implicit is endorsed: that implicit measures are those which bypass conscious awareness, or 
accesstap states that are beyond direct control. But this is to fall back on the understandings 
of  that we have problematised above.

e. Implicit as discursively useful
It is worth noting another recent trend in the usage of the term 'implicit', which suggests a 
rather different agenda from those so far identified (in D1 D4). This usage has most 
prominently been observed in Hillary Clinton's remarks that ‘We all have implicit biases ... 
What we need to do is be more honest about that, and surface them. Because today, most 
people believe that they don't have those biases’.20 Clinton may have had in mind a 
particular psychological phenomenon when making these claims. But more likely she is 
using the notion of implicit bias in a way consistent with how the usage of many activists   
within and outside of philosophy   and practitioners running training sessions: as a way of 
opening up discussions about exclusion and marginalisation. Using 'implicit' in this sense 
usually carries the following important implications: of acknowledging complicity, and taking 
responsibility. By acknowledging that bias is pervasive, and that everyone may be complicit 
in perpetuating discrimination and marginalisation, discussion of the problems can avoid 
finger pointing or labelling some ‘bad’ individuals as 'the problem'. This seems to have the 
pragmatic effect of collectively taking responsibility for the fact that things are not as they 
should be, and that everyone should have a role in fixing this. The main aim of using 
in this sense, then, appears to be:

D5: to gain traction in addressing problems of marginalisation and under 
representation, and draw attention to complicity in these problems.

Note that this primarily pragmatic, discursively useful notion of the implicit need not take a 
stand on whether there is any distinctive psychological reality underpinning the responses 
recorded in indirect measures, that can be distinguished from explicit states or characterised 
by a unique set of properties. However, using the notion of  for these pragmatic aims 
will be hostage to empirical fortune in one sense: it must be true that it is a helpful way of 
addressing problems of exclusion and marginalisation, and not a distraction from alternative 
ways of addressing these problems (see Haslanger 2015 for worries along these lines).

In this section, we have argued that there are various ways of characterising the notion of 
, and each is motivated by a somewhat different set of concerns. However, none of 
these ways of characterising the implicit is wholly satisfactory: which costs or gains one is 
willing to take on, then, may depend on the aims to which one gives priority.

5. What is 	

 
20
 http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/20/politics/hillary clinton race implicit biases/index.html
 See also her remarks in the first presidential debate that 'implicit bias is a problem for everyone’: 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/melanie hunter/
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 
In this section, we delineate the choices to be made about how to characterise the notion of 
	
, and tease out the ways one’s answer to this question is located in relation to the other 
theoretical choices available.

i. Bias is bad
Many of the scholars working on implicit bias have used the term ‘bias’ in a way that 
presupposes that it is something normatively bad. This usage chimes with common sense 
understandings of what it is to be biased: in particular, biased 		
someone or some 
group. For example, Saul writes that ‘in the case of women in philosophy, implicit biases will 
be unconscious biases that affect the way we perceive (for instance) the quality of a 
woman’s work, leading us to evaluate it more negatively than it deserves’ (2013a: 40). 
Biases, here are linked to distorted and negative evaluations. 
 In another paper, Saul writes that biases ‘are unconscious, automatic tendencies to 
associate certain traits with members of particular social groups, in ways that lead to some 
very disturbing errors’ (2013b: 244). Here, ‘bias’ is used to capture cases in which there are 
‘disturbing errors’. In both cases, Saul clarifies that there is another usage of ‘bias’ whereby 
bias is not necessarily bad. However, given that the focus is on a certain range of 
phenomena   those in which stigmatising biases are operative   the theoretical choice is 
made to use ‘bias’to denote cases where something has gone wrong. The task, then, is to 
spell out exactly what standard implicit biases, in the bad sense, lead us to fall short of. 
Saul’s remarks helpfully suggest two sorts of normative standards: biases might lead us into 
moral error (when we evaluate people in undeserved ways) or rational error (when we reach 
false or unwarranted judgements).

a. 	
 as irrationality
We might want to diagnose bias as bad because it leads agents who are influenced by it into 
failures of rationality. One might claim that these states or processes constitute a bias since 
they lead to failures of practical rationality, or the thwarting of an individual’s goals: she has 
the goal of hiring the best candidate, but fails to do so because gender bias inflects her 
evaluation of the applicant’s CV. Note, though that this strategy makes our diagnosis of a 
state as bias dependent on the agent’s goals and values. This captures bias in cases where 
implicit cognition is dissonant with the agent’s values (cf. D2 above); but it may be inapt if 
one also wants to characterise as bias also those cases in which the bias resonates with the 
agent’s values (see D4 above).
An alternative criteria for identifying the states as ‘bias’ is to see them as constituting 
a failure of theoretical rationality, or violation of good knowledge seeking practice. For 
example, Saul writes that we are simply making errors because our judgements are ‘being 
influenced by factors [that are] totally irrelevant’, namely, social category information (Saul 
2013b, 247). Saul spells out this failure in terms of the irrelevance of the factors that are 
influencing judgement, but there may be various ways of unpacking the failure at issue. We 
might identify bias in the failure to reliably track the truth; in failures of sensitivity to evidence 
or of appropriate trust in testimony; failures of epistemic responsibility or to exercise 
epistemic virtues (see Holroyd & Puddifoot, forthcoming, for articulation of the ways implicit 
biases might violate a variety of epistemic norms). The point is that there are various ways in 
which these states or processes might violate norms of inquiry and knowledge seeking: any 
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 
of these standards would identify ‘bias’ in a wider set of cases than the standards of practical 
rationality.
 This position requires defence against the claim that implicit biases, at least 
sometimes, present no violation of such standards. Rather, they may, but rather   insofar as 
they represent associations learned from our environment   present useful base rate 
information about social groups. This is what Gendler suggests, the view that Gendler has 
proposed, arguing that to try to prevent bias from influencing judgement is, on some 
occasions,  to thereforeto face some epistemic costs (Gendler 2011). However, as Kelly & 
Roedder suggest: 
 
such associations almost always extend beyond what is rational, and there will 
almost always be a ‘remainder’: an implicit association that goes beyond what 
rationality endorses (2008: 530).

What this ‘remainder’ consists in requires explication, but there are various options available. 
One may doubt , but one may appeal to doubts about whether implicit biases can encode 
such statistical data (see Puddifoot ms. for concerns about whether crudely associative 
states provide such base rate information). Or one may doubt that; or whether they have a 
structure that renders them appropriately reasons responsive (see Levy, 2015 discussed 
below) and subject to revision in light of evidence (Madva 2016). Thus, the feasibility of 
one’s views about whether a state constitutes a bias   whether it violates norms of rationality 
or good inquiry   hinges on further questions about what these states are and how they 
behave.

b. Bias as immoral
In some cases, we might want to identify the cognitions as 	
, but find that they are less 
easily diagnosed as violating standards of theoretical rationality, since they are not obviously 
or always engaged in knowledge seeking contexts: consider the micro behaviours outlined 
above. Such behaviours might hinder inquiry (e.g. if they affect interactions involving 
testimony (cf. Dotson 2012)) but need not; they might instead make for chilly or hostile 
environments. This might undermine something the agent wants (e.g. an inclusive and 
respectful workplace). But if one has concerns about spelling out the notion of bias in terms 
of failures of practical rationality, one might instead see such cases as ‘bias’ simply because 
they involve falling short of some moral standard. Kelly & Roedder observe that implicit 
biases are obviously morally problematic when they lead to harmful or unfair consequences 
(2008: 527). One reason for focusing on these particular sorts of cognitions and the 
behaviours they underpin is precisely because of their relationship to patterns of 
marginalisation, exclusion, and their implication in unjust social structures (cf Saul 2013a; 
Haslanger 2016). Alternatively, one might see certain states as bias because they are 
premised on malevolence (Garcia, 2004) or disrespect (Blum, 2004) towards the groups 
they target (see Kelly & Roedder 2008 for discussion).
 Note that articulating such a standard, and seeing failures to meet it as definitive of 
states that are 	

 again captures a broader set of phenomenon than is included by a 
standard indexed to the agent’s goals (cf. D4).

ii. Bias itself is normatively neutral. 
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We observed that those who focus on the badness of bias nonetheless acknowledge that 
	
 may be used in a broader sense, to capture a wide range of phenomena that may be 
involved in implicit cognition. For example, in a footnote, Saul observes that one might use 
the term simply to pick out implicit associations (2013b: 40, fn4). This would be to use the 
term in a normatively neutral way: to denote a broad set of cognitive phenomena which 
includes those states or processes that are good or bad: an automatic association between 
‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ would, on this view, also be an implicit bias. This usage resonates with the 
idea that the cognitive phenomena at issue extends beyond those involved in social 
cognition about stigmatised groups. For example, psychologists working on market research 
have focused on the role of implicit associations in brand preferences and consumer choice 
(Gregg & Klymowsky 2013). Others have examined the role of implicit associations in the 
context of health behaviours and policy decisions (e.g. Macy et al 2013, Stacy et al 2000). 
Indeed, some biases, in this neutral sense, may be indispensable in navigating and 
understanding the world. The task then is to identify why those which 	 bad are identified 
as such.
 One theorist who proposes such a conception of bias is Antony, who argues that 
‘bias plays an essential and constructive role in the development of human knowledge’ 
(2016: 158; see also her 1993). On this understanding ‘bias’ simply means ‘a tendency: an 
inclination of temperament or outlook’ (2016: 162)   such tendencies, she argues, are 
inevitable for limited cognitive agents such as ourselves, and moreover, are often useful in 
focusing our enquiry on salient possibilities. The key task, then, is to identify which 
inclinations are innocuous or positively helpful, and which are problematic. Antony’s main 
focus is on which biases incline us away from the truth, and which towards it   and this, she 
proposes should be uncovered by naturalistic methods: observations of how enquiry 
proceeds.

In section 3, we argued that the line one takes on what the  is depends on what aims 
one has in theorising   what desiderata one is trying to meet. Note that the same is true with 
respect to which view of 	
  as bad, or as normatively neutral   one endorses. For 
example, if one is focused primarily on drawing attention to problematic phenomena (D5), 
then the usage of bias in the narrower sense (bias as bad) might be efficacious. On the 
other hand, it may be politically helpful to be able to point out the continuum between implicit 
biases of the problematic sort and cognitive phenomena on the other (what works will 
essentially be an empirical matter, and it may depend on the context). Or one might be 
motivated by wider theoretical aims: for example, Antony is motivated by commitment to a 
model of enquiry that does not rest on implausible, and unachievable, ideals of ‘objectivity’, 
but better descriptively captures how enquiry proceeds. Moreover, whether one sees bias as 
bad or normatively neutral may depend on, or in turn inform, the view one endorses 
regarding what psychological reality these states or processes have. We turn to this issue in 
the final section. 

6. What psychological reality might implicit bias have?
Much of the philosophical literature has focused on how to characterise the psychological 
reality underlying the responses, judgements and behaviours described in the first section. 
Here, we survey some of this literature, and tease out which of the theoretical and practical 
choices, identified earlier, appear to underpin these views on the psychological reality of 
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 
implicit bias.21 These choices have often not been manifest in the articulation of these views: 
our hope is that in elucidating these issues, it makes clearer the commitments taken on by 
any one such account. 

a. beliefs




Some authors have argued that implicit biases are best modelled as familiar mental states: 
beliefs. For example, Mandlebaum proposes that we consider implicit biases as ‘honest to 
god propositionally structured mental representations that we bear the belief relation to’ 
(2015, p.7). However, such beliefs are unconscious. This means that (not necessarily, but at 
least typically) they do not figure in our conscious thought. Yet, because they are 
propositionally structured, implicit biases can function inferentially, and in reasons 
responsive ways   even whilst beyond the reach of our reflective awareness.
 We are now well positioned to identify the theoretical choices that underpin such an 
account. First, Mandlebaum is clear that one of the key desiderata he is guided by is that of 
cohering with, and accommodating the empirical evidence (D4). One of the key arguments 
for his view is that it better explains empirical studies in which implicit biases seem to be 
operational in inferential reasoning processes. Second, that this view clearly takes a stance 
on the sense in which these biases are and hence differ from explicit thought 
(compare D1): namely, they are 

. Finally, note that this view arguably ends up 
with commitments to the scope of the phenomena at issue: namely, those cases where 
implicit biases are 

	 with explicit beliefs (cf D2). This is because, as Holroyd (2016) 
has argued, it is difficult to apply this view to cases in which implicit and explicit beliefs are 
aligned (is there then one belief, both conscious and unconscious?). 
 Notwithstanding the empirical evidence that Mandlebaum marshals in support of the 
unconscious belief view, some authors remain unconvinced of the claim that they are beliefs 
thus construed. For example, Madva (2016) has argued that implicit biases are probably not 
beliefs, since empirical evidence suggests a number of cases in which they fail to meet what 
he specifies as a necessary condition for belief, namely sensitivity to logical form. Similarly, 
Levy (2015) has suggested that even if biases have propositional structure, they appear to 
be insufficiently responsive to evidence to support the claim that they function as beliefs do. 
Rather, Levy proposes a 

 mental state that better accommodates the 
characteristic features of implicit biases (see section b. below). 



Schwitzgebel (2010) has a rather different proposal for modelling implicit biases: as cases of 
‘in between belief’. This assumes an understanding of beliefs as broad track dispositions. 
When we have dispositions   to assert, to behave   in ways that belie seemingly inconsistent 
beliefs, Schwitzgebel claims, we should say that we ‘kind of’ or ‘in between believe’. For 
example, an individual who professes a commitment to racial equality, yet nonetheless 
under evaluates the CVs of black and minority ethnicity applicants, has dispositions 
 
21
 This survey is not comprehensive, in part because of the rate at which the literature is developing. For 
example, a number of philosophers are also exploring the idea, in unpublished work, that implicit biases are best 
understood as imaginings.
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 
consistent both with believing that race is irrelevant to the suitability of an applicant for a job, 
and not believing this.
 Importantly, this view does not take on any particular commitments about the sense 
in which implicit biases are and in fact no distinctive properties are attributed to the 
dispositions that manifest what we might identify as the implicit beliefs. Indeed, the analysis 
given in the case of implicit bias would not differ from a case in which an agent has 
conflicting explicit beliefs: in both cases we ascribe conflicting beliefs on the basis of 
dispositions that indicate the agent believes  and not . For those who have doubts about 
the feasibility of the distinction between implicit and explicit biases (cf. D1 vs. D4), this may 
be a virtue of the account. Second, note that this view appears motivated in particular by the 
concern to capture cases in which there is dissonance between the biases and agent’s 
asserted beliefs (D2). In cases where an agent’s biases accord with her beliefs and values, 
there will be no ‘in between’ belief to speak of (see Holroyd 2016). The appeal of this 
account, then, may depend on the scope of the phenomena one is seeking to capture.

b. 

 states
Some authors have suggested that the empirical findings about implicit bias cannot easily be 
made sense of within a framework that posits familiar, folk psychological mental states. 
Instead, new

 states need to be introduced to make good sense of the 
phenomena.

	


Levy (2015), for instance, has argued that implicit biases are best understood as mental 
states that he dubs ‘patchy endorsements’. These mental states have some propositional 
structure, but are not responsive to reasons in the way that other of our attitudes, such as 
beliefs, typically are. The ‘patchiness’ of biases means that they do not stand in inferential 
relations with other attitudes, and so cannot integrate with the agent’s other mental states. 
This has implications for their role in agency: patchy endorsements are not integrated into 
the agent, so they cannot be attributable to an agent (she cannot be blamed for them or their 
role in action).
 Again, we can tease out the theoretical choices informing this view: first, it is largely 
driven by the empirical evidence   which suggests both that biases may sometimes have 
propositional structure, and that they are not involved in inferential processing to the same 
degree as other mental states (D4). Second, an underlying assumption of modelling implicit 
biases as ‘patchy’ appears to be that what distinguishes implicit attitudes is that they are not 
subject to the same kind of normative or rational control that other attitudes can be governed 
by (D1). But recall that we saw above  note also the assumption that a lack of integration 
with other inferential states means that the biases are not integrated into the agent as a 
whole   and to the extent that they are, Levy suggests, their status as 'implicit' is in doubt. 
This indicates that the scope of the phenomena with which Levy is concerned, again, is 
primarily restricted to those instancescases in which the implicit bias conflicts with the 
agent’s other attitudes (D2). The account is less well placed to speak to cases in which the 
agent’s biases are aligned with and reinforce her biased explicit attitudes (D4). If one 
maintains that these cases in which biases are aligned with the agent’s beliefs and values 
constitute an important subset of the phenomena at issue (see Holroyd 2016, Zheng 2016), 
then this will be a problematic aspect of Levy’s account.
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 

	

Gendler has introduced the notion of 	 to capture certain aspects of our cognition, 
including implicit biases. These mental states, aliefs, are associative, automatic and 
arational, and are activated by the agent’s environment (2008a, p.642). Aliefs are states 
constituted by tripartite clusters of co activated contents: this includes representational 
content, affective states, and the readying of motor responses. The representational content 
of aliefs need not be propositional, and aliefs can be held consciously or non consciously. 
For example, the alief model would reconstruct implicit biases involved in CV studies as 
including the following contents: ‘black applicant [representational]; negative 
affect/evaluation [affective response]; deflate judgement/avoidance response [readying of 
motor responses]’. Gendler uses discordant cases, where aliefs conflict with, and serve to 
undermine, the agent’s endorsed values and attitudes, to elucidate the phenomenon. 
However, she emphasises that aliefs may also be in accordance with her beliefs and other 
explicit attitudes (2008b, p.554).
 We can already see that unlike the two belief accounts, and the patchy endorsement 
view, considered above, this account is positioned to capture a broader range of phenomena 
(D4). Aliefs may be involved not only in those cases where biases are dissonant with and 
undermine the agent’s values; but also those in which the biases   aliefs   underpin and 
support the agent’s explicit attitudes. Another feature of Gendler’s treatment of biases is that 
in identifying them as aliefs, she locates them alongside a range of other phenomena that 
she describes as involving automatic and associative states, such as aversion to eating 
fudge shaped like faeces; fear responses to standing high up in locations one knows to be 
safe (2008a). In so positioning implicit biases qua aliefs, we see that the distinguishing 
feature of these phenomena is not that they are unconscious or inaccessible   one can 
perfectly well observe one’s aliefs in relation to the high walk way or faeces shaped 
chocolate. Rather, a more likely candidate for distinguishing them from mental states 
involved in reflective or deliberative thought (D1) is rather that their activation is 
unintentional, or that their operation is not under our control, in ways other mental states 
may be. For example, Gendler suggests that the co activation of the constituents of aliefs is 
automatic, such that the representational component will automatically activate the affective 
and behavioural components. In contrast, explicit beliefs are ‘combinatoric’, namely, apt for 
combination with any other belief or desire.
 Some authors have expressed scepticism about the notion of alief (e.g. Currie & 
Ichino 2012, discussed in Holroyd 2016), and suggested that our picture of the mind can 
accommodate the constituents of alief (affect, representation, motor response) without 
supposing that they cluster and constitute a new sort of mental state. Indeed, there may be 
reasons to avoid a model of implicit bias that maintains they uniformly have this tripartite 
feature, since there may be various dimensions of heterogeneity in the mental states that 
comprise the phenomena (see Madva & Brownstein 2016, Holroyd & Sweetman 2016, for 
discussion of these dimensions of heterogeneity22). If one seeks a model that can capture all 
of these phenomena (D4), then modelling implicit bias as tripartite aliefs may be problematic. 

 

Madva & Brownstein 2016 also identify important dimensions of heterogeneity that an account of implicit biases 
should accommodate, but note that they see their view as compatible with seeing biases as ‘alief like'.
Page 15 of 24
Philosophy Compass
Philosophy Compass
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
 	
c. traits
The views we have considered so far all posit implicit biases are some sort of mental state   
beliefs (variously characterised), or some 

 mental state such as a patchy 
endorsements, or aliefs. This supposes that implicit biases can be tokened implicitly or 
explicitly: any such view thereby takes on a commitment to explicating what it is to be implicit 
rather than explicit (D1). This assumption has been put under pressure by Machery, who 
has suggested that we should think of attitudes as traits. As such, attitude are dispositions to 
cognize, respond affectively, and behave in certain ways. Since they are dispositional 
profiles, they are not the sort of thing that can be implicit or explicit. What have been 
referring to as implicit biases are the manifestation of certain dispositions to evaluate, or feel 
certain ways, in response to certain stimuli.  The sorts of things we might be inclined to call 
‘explicit attitudes’, Machery argues, are better understood as judgements about attitudes, 
rather than expressions of attitudes themselves. These judgements can be more or less 
accurate, which is what accounts for the cases in which there is dissonance between an 
agent’s behaviour or affective response, and her pronouncements about what she believes 
or values (cf. D2).23
 This view explicitly seeks to avoid any commitment to identifying the distinguishing 
property between implicit and explicit attitudes, then (cf. D1). Moreover, such a view fares 
better in accommodating the empirical evidence (D4), Machery  argues: the complexity of 
our attitudes, construed as traits, explains why there is little correlation between indirect 
measures, and why behaviour may not be predicted by the results of any one indirect 
measure. Since the various psychological bases of our attitudes are involved in the 
production of behaviour, we would not expect any one such component to predict it.
 However, note that the success of this view trades on an ambiguity in the literature to 
which we have not yet adverted: that between implicit bias and implicit attitudes. Some 
authors refer to the phenomena at issue as implicit bias; others to implicit attitudes (in 
particular, Levy 2014, 2017forthcoming). This elision occurs partly because psychologists 
refer to evaluative responses as attitudes, and partly because one of the points of contention 
in the philosophical literature is whether implicit biases can be attributable to the agent, and 
therefore be part of the evaluation of ‘who the agent is’ and ‘what she stands for’: issues that 
have typically been referred to as pertaining to the agent’s attitudes (cf. Holroyd 2012, 
Brownstein 2015, Levy 2014, Zheng 2016). This matters for Machery’s view, since he is 
suggesting that the agent’s various dispositions constitute her attitudes, and these attitudes, 
understood as multi track dispositional profiles, cannot be implicit or explicit. However, this 
view still supposes that there are various psychological bases of the attitude   some of which 
may be mental states, and some of which may therefore admit of being implicit or explicit. If 
biases at issue in the phenomena we have been discussing here are identified with some of 

 mental states (which are constituents of attitudes), then it will remain a live question as 
to what sense, if any,  are implicit, and what property (if any) distinguishes them from 
explicit mental states that also constitute the psychological basis of the disposition.

 
23
 Machery's trait view may have difficulties ascribing attitudes to agents whose dispositional profiles reflect 
ambivalence of attitude (since their dispositions reveal neither an all things considered positive, nor all things 
considered negative, attitude). Lee proposes an alternative conceptualisation that accommodates both the mean 
and distribution of likings/dislikings and other attitude relevant states, and as such, she argues, is better able to 
deal with such ambivalence. See Lee (ms.).
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
e. eliminativism
In this section, we introduce an alternative view that, as far as we know, is yet to be argued 
for. This view is eliminativism about implicit bias. It holds that there is no such psychological 
kind, and therefore no account that attempts to characterise implicit bias as a particular 
mental state or psychological kind will succeed. On this view, there is no unified phenomena, 
with any distinctive set of characteristics, that underpins the behavioural responses found on 
indirect measures such as those we introduced at the start. Rather, a cluster of different 
mental states and processes may produce these responses; and these mental states and 
processes may also be involved in the production of responses on other measures, such as 
self report or direct measures. 
 This has much in common with Machery’s proposal that the psychological basis of 
traits is diverse, which is to say that an agent’s dispositions to respond to social groups will 
include cognitive associations, affective responses, propositional attitudes, evaluations, 
motor responses and so on. Yet, eliminativism resists the temptation to unite these 
responses into a psychological kind, ‘attitude’ (or anything else).24 Instead, eliminativism 
maintains that the phenomena of implicit biases is best understood as involving various 
different mental states and processes, which may not share any property other than that of 
being recorded by a particular indirect measure (but this is not definitive of the implicit, since 
the states measured may also be recorded by self report or other measures).
 Presumably the appeal of such a view would be that its flexibility positions it well to 
capture the phenomena at issue (D4), including the heterogeneity of the phenomena, in 
terms of the states involved and the different kinds of behavioural outputs they might be 
implicated in (see Holroyd & Sweetman 2016; Madva & Brownstein 2016). It remains to be 
seen whether such a view is supported by empirical evidence, and the details will be 
important in ascertaining whether it is able to deliver adequate interventions (D3). But note 
that such a view need not commit to any particular property as characteristic of or necessary 
for a state being implicit (rather than explicit) (D1). Rather, this view could maintain that this 
is simply a convention used to refer to those states or processes involved in the production 
of responses on indirect measures. From the point of view of constructing an adequate 
picture of the mind, it is somewhat misleading to refer to these states as ‘implicit biases’, as 
if that identified a psychological kind. From the perspective of constructing an adequate 
theory of our psychological goings on, we could eliminate the notion of ‘implicit bias’ and still 
be able to well describe what states and processes are involved in the responses measured.
 One might resist this move by insisting that the notion of implicit bias can pick out a 
psychological kind, but specify a more fine grained notion than that which has so far been at 
issue: a subset of those biases that have been identified as implicit biases. Such a 
revisionary view could then be evaluated in terms of the desiderata it satisfies.  
 Does taking an eliminativist view about the psychological reality of implicit bias mean 
that one must also be eliminativist about the language and terminology of ‘implicit bias’ and 
that we would do better to wholesale avoid such misleading references? Recall that one of 
the desiderata outlined above was primarily pragmatic (D5). If one seeks to draw attention to 
the phenomena of discrimination that has long been overlooked or ignored and motivate 
 
24
 Of course, to suggest eliminativism about implicit bias and deny that they are e.g. attitudes is not to suggest 
eliminativism about attitudes.
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 
collective responsibility in addressing it, then it matters not if there is no unified psychological 
kind involved in those discriminatory patterns. 
This seems to us a legitimate usage of the notion of ‘implicit bias’, despite its 
commitment to the absence of any such mental item as ‘implicit bias’   so long as 
proponents of this view are clear that they are motivated by aims other than to capture the 
psychological reality of our minds. However, if one has doubts about the efficacy of the 
notion even for these political purposes, then a wholesale eliminativism may have appeal.
 

7. Concluding remarks
We have surveyed some of the competing views about the domain of the implicit, the nature 
of bias, and the psychological reality of implicit biases. We sought to identify the often 
unarticulated aims or tacit desiderata that each position appears to be motivated by, and 
teased out the commitments of each view. We do not here intend to take a decisive stance 
on the merits of these aims or commitments, but merely to identify that there 	 such 
commitments, since these are theoretical choices about which authors have not always 
been clear. Our hope is that bringing to light some of these competing aims enables a 
clearer and more robust defence of the notion of implicit bias, and a clearer sense of what 
we want to use that notion for.



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